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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

WALKER REALTY and
CALVIN FLORENCE,
Plaintiffs and
Appellants,
Case No. 14121

vs.
JOHN E. RUNYAN, ESQ.,
AIR FREIGHT, INC.,
E. DEAN SHELLEDY,
MT. OLYMPUS ASSOCIATES,
SHELTER, INC., and
BETTILYON REALTY, INC.,
Defendants and
Respondents.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action brought to recover a broker's
commission allegedly owing to the Plaintiffs-Appellants
from the Defendants-Respondents.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Defendants' motion for summary judgment was heard
by the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Jr. Upon hearing argument
of counsel and examining the pleadings on file, the court
granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment as to Counts
I ahd II of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint. Counsel for
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the parties stipulated before the court that summary judgment
as to Counts III and IV of Plaintiffs1 Second Amended Complaint
i ,..,v,tJ r..... ., .. .,,,
^friSMG*.!'* KIVJA'*

should be granted against Plaintiffs.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL '• ns.i% m
Defendants-Respondents seek affirmance of the
i ' i l <-»! « O M SjflSr

{

^jiy

judgment of the trial court.
(

».Q33 »HAYHU« .3 «fior.
.YfJ3J,;l?H3 UAMa . H •

STATEMENT OF FACTS

On or before March 18, 1974, Plaintiffs-Appellants
(hereinafter referred to as "Appellants") and DefendantsRespondents (hereinafter referred to as "Respondents") entered
into an oral brokerage agreement for the sale of real estate,
P/rpi^fTliriqp.^q ^in

V**TQ:&

which agreement was subsequently confirmed by a letter from
John E. Runyan dated March 18, 1974 (R.41).

The agreement

specifically provided that the broker's commission was contingent upon the ultimate completion and delivery of the building
as provided for in the written agreement between Respondents
dated March 18, 1974 (R.44).

The uncontroverted affidavits of

Respondents established that the building was not delivered
as provided and Appellants were, therefore, not entitled to
the contingent broker's commission (R.50, 55-6). JciaionoP srii ™d
H

Subsequent to that date, the parties discussed another

agreement for the sale of the building in question.

John E.

TD

Runyan sent E. Dean Shelledy an offer by letter dated October 18,
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1974 (R.42-3), providing that Appellants were to receive a brokerfs
commission should the contract be accepted by Shelledy. The
uncontroverted affidavits of Respondents established that this
offer was never accepted by Shelledy and Appellants were, therefore# not entitled to any brokerfs commission (R.50-1).
Appellants then brought this action to recover
a broker's commission on the proposed transactions, based
upon the letters and proposed contract cited hereinabove
and upon an alleged oral brokerage agreement (R.32,
•

$2).

ARGUMENT

Point I
THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT WAS PROPER
FOR THE REASON THAT THERE WERE NO DISPUTED
ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT.
It is evident from the record before the trial
court that there were no disputed issues of material fact
before that court. Appellants have completely misinterpreted
the meaning and significance of John E. Runyan's letter of
October 18, 1974 (R.42-3).
an offer —

The letter on its face is simply

an offer to modify the previously abandoned

agreement. The third paragraph of the letter makes this clear,
referring to several conditions upon which Shelledy1s "acceptance is contingent11.

It is further significant that the

offer contains space for an acceptance by Shelledy, which
space is vacant. The offer was not accepted, as shown by the
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lack of Shelledy's signature on the agreement, and by the
uncontroverted affidavit of John E. Runyan (R.50-1) which
states that the letter of October 18, 1974, was simply an
offer that was never accepted.
There is no disputed issue of material fact in
this case. The agreement stated in the letter of March 18,
1974 (R.44), is clearly contingent, and the contingency failed
to materialize.

The letter of October 18, 1974, is nothing

more than an offer that was never accepted.

There is no

conflict between the two documents. The uncontroverted affidavits of the Respondents make that clear —

protestations of

the Appellants in their Brief notwithstanding.
Point II
THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS DOES NOT DISTINGUISH
BETWEEN "BROKERAGE" CONTRACTS AND "FINDER'S
FEE" CONTRACTS, AND THIS CASE FALLS SQUARELY
WITHIN ITS PROVISIONS.
Notwithstanding the claims made by Appellants
at Point II of their Brief, the Utah Statute of Frauds does
not differentiate between finder's fee and brokerage agreements.
The case cited by Appellants of Palmer v. Wahler, 133 Cal.App.2d
705, 285 P.2d 8 (1955), does not support Appellants1 claim.
In that case the court determined that the conflict in question
dealt with chattels and not with "real estate" within the
meaning of the Statute of Frauds (Id. 12-13).

Therefore,

any language relating to finder's fees and sales of real estate
is rendered mere obiter dictum.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Additionally, the case is easily distinguished.
First, the Utah Statute of Frauds at §25-5-4, U.C.A., is substantially different from the California Statute of Frauds
found at Peering's California Codes, §1624, which is phrased
differently and includes leases and short-term sales which
the Utah statute does not.

Secondly, Appellants have mis-

interpreted the holding of the Palmer case, supraP

The court

in Palmer interpreted the law to read that an oral brokerage
agreement for the sale of real estate was valid, in spite of
the Statute of Frauds, if the finder was not a licensed agent
or broker.

The plaintiff in Palmer recovered his fee only

because he was not a licensed broker.

In other words, the

"exception" alluded to by Appellants was not a finder's fee
exception, but rather a non-broker fee exception.
The present case is clearly and easily distinguished
from Palmer for the simple reason that Appellants in the present
case admittedly are licensed real estate brokers (R.32) and,
thereby, do not meet the requirement of the non-broker fee
exception.

This interpretation of Palmer is borne out by a

reading of the subsequent decision of Porter v. Eirod, Inc.,
51 Cal. 784 (1966),
Commentators have accepted the Palmer
case as establishing that a finder's
agreement with an unlicensed finder
is not within the contemplation of
the Statute of Frauds. Id. 787.
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The situation created by the Palmer case and the
judicial precedent it set were unique to California during
the period from 1955 to 1967, and the situation has been described in at least one recorded instance as an "anomaly"
(Hasekian v. Krotz, 74 Cal. 410, 413 (1969)).

Not only does

the Palmer case deal with a unique interpretation of a unique
situation, but the decision is totally irrelevant to the present
case since Appellants are both licensed brokers. Not only this,
but the California Legislature was evidently so shocked by
the Palmer decision that it completely erased its inequitable
consequences in 1967 by amending the statute in question* As
stated in Krotz, supra, 413 n. 4:

r

In 1967, the Legislature put an end to
this anomaly by further amending Civil
Code Section 1624, subdivision 5, by
adding the words "or any other person",
with the result that now a finder's
agreement by whomsoever made must be
in writing. (Emphasis added.)
y Palmer was a unique decision based on a grossly

inequitable interpretation of statute, and the California
Legislature effectively removed it from the annals of judicial
precedent.

It now stands as no more than a lifeless relic,

and Appellants have unfortunately dredged it up and misinterpreted its vitiated rule of law.

The case is dead; and even

if it were alive, it would be irrelevant since the Appellants
are licensed brokers.
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POINT III
THE ALLEGED BROKERAGE CONTRACT HAS.,NOT BEEN
FULLY PERFORMED, AND APPLICATION OF THE
STATUTE OF FRAUDS DOES NOT THEREFORE PERPETRATE A FRAUD OR GROSS INEQUITY.
Appellants claim at Point III of their Brief that
on the basis of the Utah decision of Welchman v. Wood, 9 Ut.25 25,
337 P.2d 410 (1959), it would be a fraud or a gross inequity to
invoke the Statute of Frauds.
is not soundly based.

Such reliance on the Welchman case

In Welchman, supra, the court dealt with

a situation where the broker had been paid his commission and
the brokerage contract was fully performed.

A more exact look

at the language quoted by Appellants at Page 4 of their Brief
substantiates this.
. . .the plaintiffs have fully performed
by paying the commission, which full performance would eliminate any application
of the statute of frauds, becauses (sic)
it may not be invoked to perpetrate a fraud
or gross inequity. Id. 411.
The statement in the Welchman case that the Statute of
Frauds may not be invoked "to perpetrate a fraud or gross inequity"
is clearly in reference to the rule that where a realty owner has
fully executed and ratified an oral brokerage contract by paying
the broker his full commission, it would be grossly inequitable
to then allow that same property owner to deny the contract*

The

rule is sound, but in the present case it is irrelevant.
Appellants mistakenly argue that "the lower court was
in error if it granted summary judgment on that basis /Statute of
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Frauds/ because plaintiff has fully performed. . • ."

(Appel-

lants1 Brief, 4 ) . This is not the way the rule works. To so
interpret the Welchman rule is to render the Statute of Frauds
inoperative, since in every case where a broker petitions the
court for a commission he has "fully performed" his part of
the transaction.

The "full performance" rule enunciated in

Welchman applies only where the entire contract has been fully
performed and the commission has been paid.
In the present case we clearly do not have a situation
where the broker's commission has been paid (R.34, $10), and
the Welchman rule is inapplicable.

A cursory examination of

the other cases cited by Appellants (Ravarino v. Price, 123 Ut.
559# 260 P.2d 570 (1955); and Chadwick v. Arnold, 34 Ut. 48,
95 P. 527 (1909)) discloses that those decisions are completely
irrelevant to the facts before this court as neither case
deals with oral brokerage agreements.

Here, again, the exception

to the Statute of Frauds cited by Appellants is inapplicable
to the uncontroverted facts of the present case.
Point IV
;

THE RECORD LACKS SUFFICIENT MEMORANDA TO TAKE
THE ALLEGED BROKERAGE TRANSACTION OUTSIDE THE
PURVIEW OF THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS.
The documents cited by the Appellants as "sufficient

memoranda" of the alleged oral brokerage agreement are not sufficient by any standards. The letter of March 18, 1974, clearly
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sets forth that payment of any fee is contingent upon certain
conditions.

These conditions were not met, and the letter of

October 18, 1974, is not a memorandum of a contract but is
merely an offer to contract which was not accepted according
to the uncontroverted affidavits of John E. Runyan and E. Dean
Shelledy.

The affidavits themselves are clearly not sufficient

memoranda.

If anything, they stand in support of Respondents1

position that the alleged contract terms were not met in the
first instance (March 18, 1974) and not accepted in the second
instance (October 18, 1974).
The problem Appellants are faced with can be ascertained by a reading of one of their cited cases, Fritsch v. Hess,
49 Ut. 75, 162 P. 70 (1916).
. . .almost any kind of writing will be
sufficient if it be signed by the party
sought to be charged and contains the
essential terms of the contract. Id. 71.
(Emphasis added.)
The contract terms essential to the recovery of a
broker's commission by the Appelants are simply not present
in any writings signed by Respondents.
Point V
APPELLANTS MAY NOT REST UPON THE BARE ALLEGATIONS OF THEIR SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT WHEN
FACED WITH A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, AND
THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT AND
PROPER.
Appellants have mistakenly presumed at Point V of their
Brief that "defendant's motion for summary judgment was tantamount
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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to a motion to dismiss11 (Appellants1 Brief, 6 ) . The claims
made by Appellants notwithstanding, Rule 56(e) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure is not satisfied solely by Appellants1
Second Amended Complaint and the Affidavit of Calvin Florence*
primarily because Florence's affidavit does not dispute any
issues of material fact.

It simply states that Florence received

certain letters from John E. Runyan, copies of which were attached
to the affidavit. This is clearly insufficient.

Rule 56(e) states,

in pertinent part, as follows:
When a motion for summary judgment is made
and supported.as provided by this rule, an
adverse party may not rest upon the mere
allegations or denials of his pleading,
but his response. . .must set forth specific
facts showing that there is a genuine issue
for trial. If he does not so respond,
summary judgment, if appropriate, shall
be entered against him. (1974 supp.)
Appellants did not present to the trial court any
evidence or testimony in any form whatsoever disputing the affidavits filed by Respondents0

This being the case, Appellants

failed to show any issue of material fact, and the trial court
had no choice but to grant summary judgment to the Defendants.
Appellants apparently (and wrongfully) place reliance on an
irrelevant Kansas case as the basis of their claim.
of their Brief, they state,
. . .Defendant's motion for summary judgment. . .could have been sustained only if
the allegations of the petition clearly

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

At Page 6

- 11 -

demonstrated that the plaintiff did not
have a claim for relief. . . . Continental
Insurance Company v. Windle, 520 P^2d 1235
(Kan. 1974).
The case cited by Appellants makes no such holding.
Windle dealt with a situation where there were no affidavits or
memoranda on file, no sworn testimony, and no evidence.
The record before us consists only of plaintiff's petition and defendant's motion for
summary judgment; thus, our review is limited
to consideration of the allegations of the
petition. Id. 1237.
In the present case, the trial court's decision was based
on consideration of the Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint;
the letter of March 18, 1974; the letter of October 18, 1974;
the Affidavit of Calvin Florence (R.70); the Agreement dated
March 18, 1974; the Affidavit of E. Dean Shelledy; the Affidavit
of John E. Runyan; the Stipulation to Judgment in Civil Case No.
220511 (R.53); and the memoranda filed by counsel(R. 21, 57).
The court was entitled to consider all the testimony and exhibits
before it, and if Appellants failed to submit sufficient evidence
under Rule 56 (e) to warrant a trial on the matter, it is not
the fault of Respondents. The material facts presented to the
trial court by Respondents were uncontroverted by the Appellants
and the court rightfully determined that Appellants could not
recover as a matter of law.
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Point VI

THE SCOPE OF APPELLATE REVIEW HEREIN APPLICABLE
HAS BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY RESTRICTED BY THE PLAINTIFFSAPPELLANTS DUE TO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF
THE CASE.
The scope of appellate review in the present case is
significantly restricted by the stipulation entered into by
the Appellants in the lower court proceedings.

It was there

stipulated at the time of hearing Defendants1 motion that said
motion should be granted as to Counts III and IV of the Second
Amended Complaint (R.83).

Since the order of the court concerning

Counts III and IV was based upon stipulation by the Appellants,
they are thereby precluded from appealing the decision as it
relates to those two counts.

5 Am.Jur.2d, Appeal and Error,

§711 (1962).
The scope of appellate review is further restricted by
an important legal presumption —

one which Appellants have

failed to rebut.
The scope of appellate review is largely
influenced by a number of rebuttable presumptions, pre-eminent among which is that
which, at least where the decision has been
rendered by a court of record or a court
of general jurisdiction, assumes the correctness of the decision or ruling appealed from
and the regularity of the proceedings below.
Thus, every reasonable intendment favorable
to a ruling of the court below will be indulged,
and in the absence of an affirmative showing
to the contrary, a ruling of the court below
will be presumed to have been properly made
and for sound reasons. 5 Am.Jur02d, Appeal
and Error, §704 (1962). (Emphasis added.)

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

- 13 -

The burden of proof is upon the Appellants and they
have failed to carry that burden.

_

Finally, the scope of appellate review is also restricted
by Appellants' own Brief.

Respondents have fully answered the

issues presented by the Appellants and are not on notice as to
any other issues before the court.

In Mead v. Mead, 301 P.2d

691 (Okla 1956), the rule was stated as follows:
It is neither the duty nor the prerogative of
the Supreme Court to explore a theory which
is not raised in Appellants' Brief, to find
a valid ground on which to reverse the trial
court's judgment.
Those grounds cited by Appellants' Brief as the basis
for their appeal are insufficient to justify a reversal of the
lower court's judgment. The presumptions and rules of law
controlling the present case are wholly in support of Respondents'
position that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.
CONCLUSION
The affidavits, pleadings and exhibits on file herein,
and the law as cited in Respondents' Brief, in Respondents'
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment and in
Respondents1 Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Motion for
Summary Judgment clearly establish that there are no disputed
issues of material fact. The uncontroverted facts further
establish that Appellants cannot recover a brokerage fee on any
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of the alleged transactions.

The lower court acted properly

and correctly in granting Defendants' motion.for summary judgment*
Respectfully submitted,
JENSEN

js for Defendants-Respondents
ith 300 East, Suite 1
"Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

I hereby certify that I mailed two copies of the
foregoing Brief of Respondent to Robert J. DeBry, Attorney for
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 4835 Highland Drive, Suite 295-A, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84117, this Jl^/\Jj

day of September, 1975,

postage prepaid.
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